Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):1-22 (2013)

Authors
Florian Cova
University of Geneva
Abstract
The ‘Knobe effect’ is the name given to the empirical finding that judgments about whether an action is intentional or not seems to depend on the moral valence of this action. To account for this phenomenon, Scaife and Webber have recently advanced the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’, according to which people’s ascriptions of intentionality are driven by whether they think the agent took the outcome in consideration when taking his decision. In this paper, I examine Scaife and Webber’s hypothesis and conclude that it is supported neither by the existing literature nor by their own experiments, whose results I did not replicate, and that the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’ is not the best available account of the ‘Knobe Effect’.
Keywords Intentional action  Knobe effect  Experimental philosophy  Moral psychology  Consideration hypothesis
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1163/17455243-4681013
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
It’s the Knobe Effect, Stupid!: How to Explain the Side-Effect Effect.Hanno Sauer - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):485-503.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects.Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):214-219.
The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview.Adam Feltz - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3-4):265-277.
Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-06-20

Total views
313 ( #28,746 of 2,446,490 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #86,388 of 2,446,490 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes