Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81 (2016)

Abstract

Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory – Neo-Sentimentalism – according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.

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Robert Cowan
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

The Fittingness of Emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.
Evaluative Perception: Introduction.Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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