Oxford University Press (2019)

Authors
Christopher Cowie
Cambridge University
Abstract
Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.
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ISBN(s) 9780198842736   0198842732
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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Anti-Realism.Richardn D. Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019. [REVIEW]Alex Murphy - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):629-632.
Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’T Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.

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