Abstract
In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true, it promises to constitute an independent a posteriori intuitionist epistemology, providing an alternative to intuitionist accounts which posit a priori intuition and/or emotion as sources of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. As it is formulated, it is plausible that a necessary con- dition for the view is the truth of Ethical Perception: normal ethical agents can and do have perceptual experiences as of the instantiation of ethical properties. In this paper a sophisticated and promising account of Ethical Perception is offered. Extant objections are shown to fail. However, it will be argued that it is far from obvious that the account of Perceptual Intuitionism which emerges constitutes an independent alternative to other intuitionist accounts. This is because we have reason to think that ethical perceptual experience may be epistemically dependent on other epistemic sources, e.g. a priori intuition or emotion.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12023
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,944
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
Content and the Fittingness of Emotion.Brian Scott Ballard - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa074.
On Experiencing Moral Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):315-325.
Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
Intuitionism and Conservatism.Mark T. Nelson - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293.
Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
The Mysterious Case of Ethical Intuitionism.Stephen Robert Orr - 1995 - Dissertation, The Florida State University
Ethical Intuitionism--A Restatement.Oliver A. Johnson - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (28):193-203.
Intuitionism and Subjectivism.Mark T. Nelson - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121.
Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism.Klemens Kappel - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413.
Intuition and Its Place in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):57--77.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-03-20

Total views
202 ( #56,281 of 2,498,161 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #212,239 of 2,498,161 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes