Necessity of Thought

In Heinrich Wansing (ed.), Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning. Springer. pp. 101-20 (2015)
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Abstract

The concept of “necessity of thought” plays a central role in Dag Prawitz’s essay “Logical Consequence from a Constructivist Point of View” (Prawitz 2005). The theme is later developed in various articles devoted to the notion of valid inference (Prawitz, 2009, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). In section 1 I explain how the notion of necessity of thought emerges from Prawitz’s analysis of logical consequence. I try to expound Prawitz’s views concerning the necessity of thought in sections 2, 3 and 4. In sections 5 and 6 I discuss some problems arising with regard to Prawitz’s views.

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Cesare Cozzo
Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza

References found in this work

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft.Immanuel Kant - 2020 - Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG.
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.

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