Necessity of Thought

In Heinrich Wansing (ed.), Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning. Springer. pp. 101-20 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The concept of “necessity of thought” plays a central role in Dag Prawitz’s essay “Logical Consequence from a Constructivist Point of View” (Prawitz 2005). The theme is later developed in various articles devoted to the notion of valid inference (Prawitz, 2009, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). In section 1 I explain how the notion of necessity of thought emerges from Prawitz’s analysis of logical consequence. I try to expound Prawitz’s views concerning the necessity of thought in sections 2, 3 and 4. In sections 5 and 6 I discuss some problems arising with regard to Prawitz’s views.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,670

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

33 (#360,947)

6 months
1 (#481,005)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Cesare Cozzo
Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 261 references / Add more references