Dualism, monism, physicalism

Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85 (2000)
Abstract
Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism , but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms . There is little reason to call a view which is not reductive in either of these senses “physicalism”. If reduction is rejected, then a non-physicalist form of monism is still available, which may be called “emergentism”
Keywords Dualism  Metaphysics  Mind  Physicalism  Reductionism  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1007/BF02512314
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References found in this work BETA
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.
The Ways of Paradox.W. V. Quine - 1966 - New York: Random.

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