Dissociable realization and kind splitting

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):960-971 (2004)
Abstract
It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion
Keywords Illusion  Kind  Memory  Neuroscience  Science  Self  Splitting  Ramachandran, V
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DOI 10.1086/425945
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The Plurality of Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
Reviews. [REVIEW]John Sarnecki, Bertram F. Malle, Christopher H. Ramey & Marion Ledwig - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):539 – 555.
Reviews. [REVIEW]John Sarnecki - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):237-241.

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