Dissociable realization and kind splitting

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):960-971 (2004)
It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion
Keywords Illusion  Kind  Memory  Neuroscience  Science  Self  Splitting  Ramachandran, V
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DOI 10.1086/425945
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Kenneth Aizawa (2013). Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
John Sarnecki (2009). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):237-241.

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