Ratio 14 (4):298-317 (2001)

Tim Crane
Central European University
Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle...
Keywords Entity  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Object  Ontology
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00168
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1965 - In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell. pp. 158-80.
The Puzzle of Experience.Jerome J. Valberg - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Puzzle of Experience.Arthur W. Collins - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):246-248.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
The Hybrid Contents of Memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1263-1290.
The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):488-512.

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