Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469 (2009)

Authors
Tim Crane
Central European University
Abstract
It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.
Keywords intentionality  experience  representation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.608.x
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References found in this work BETA

Perception and Conceptual Content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
The Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
Believing in Things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
Perceiving Indeterminately.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.

View all 77 citations / Add more citations

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Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.

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