Objectivity

In James Conant & Sebastian Sunday (eds.), Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 47-61 (2019)
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Abstract

A core philosophical use of the term “objectivity” is to talk about a central metaphysical ideal. The term is employed to pick out aspects of the world that are there in the sense that any thinker who fails to register them can be said to be missing something. If we speak in this connection of a guiding concept of objectivity, we can ask what can be said about the nature of the things that fall under it. We might then speak in this further connection of different possible conceptions of objectivity. Today, thought about objectivity is dominated by a conception on which objectivity is taken to have as its hallmark the exclusion of everything subjective. Starting from a description of the relevant conception of objectivity, this chapter criticizes the kinds of considerations most commonly adduced in the conception’s favor. Along the way, the chapter uses passages from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein as its main reference points. A notable virtue of this method is that it sheds light on the transformative significance of Wittgenstein’s thought for how we construe the concept of objectivity.

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Alice Crary
The New School

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