On the Revision of Probabilistic Belief States

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):158-183 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we describe two approaches to the revision of probability functions. We assume that a probabilistic state of belief is captured by a counterfactual probability or Popper function, the revision of which determines a new Popper function. We describe methods whereby the original function determines the nature of the revised function. The first is based on a probabilistic extension of Spohn's OCFs, whereas the second exploits the structure implicit in the Popper function itself. This stands in contrast with previous approaches that associate a unique Popper function with each absolute (classical) probability function. We also describe iterated revision using these models. Finally, we consider the point of view that Popper functions may be abstract representations of certain types of absolute probability functions, but we show that our revision methods cannot be naturally interpreted as conditionalization on these functions

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,140

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
Scientific discovery based on belief revision.Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson - 1997 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (4):1352-1370.
Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs.Craig Boutilier - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
A paraconsistent theory of belief revision.Edwin D. Mares - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-24

Downloads
30 (#391,096)

6 months
1 (#447,993)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.
Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
Why Bayesian Psychology Is Incomplete.Frank Döring - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (S1):S379 - S389.
Why bayesian psychology is incomplete.Frank Döring - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):389.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Theory contraction through base contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.

View all 18 references / Add more references