On the Revision of Probabilistic Belief States
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):158-183 (1995)
Abstract
In this paper we describe two approaches to the revision of probability functions. We assume that a probabilistic state of belief is captured by a counterfactual probability or Popper function, the revision of which determines a new Popper function. We describe methods whereby the original function determines the nature of the revised function. The first is based on a probabilistic extension of Spohn's OCFs, whereas the second exploits the structure implicit in the Popper function itself. This stands in contrast with previous approaches that associate a unique Popper function with each absolute (classical) probability function. We also describe iterated revision using these models. Finally, we consider the point of view that Popper functions may be abstract representations of certain types of absolute probability functions, but we show that our revision methods cannot be naturally interpreted as conditionalization on these functionsDOI
10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833
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Citations of this work
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Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
Probabilistic dynamic belief revision.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
Why Bayesian Psychology Is Incomplete.Frank Döring - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (S1):S379 - S389.
References found in this work
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
On the logic of theory change: Safe contraction.Carlos E. Alchourrón & David Makinson - 1985 - Studia Logica 44 (4):405 - 422.
Theory contraction through base contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.