Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (4):553-561 (2014)

Peter van Inwagen has long claimed that he doesn’t understand substitutional quantification and that the notion is, in fact, meaningless. Van Inwagen identifies the source of his bewilderment as an inability to understand the proposition expressed by a simple sentence like “,” where “$\Sigma$” is the existential quantifier understood substitutionally. I should think that the proposition expressed by this sentence is the same as that expressed by “.” So what’s the problem? The problem, I suggest, is that van Inwagen takes traditional existential quantification to be ontologically committing and substitutional quantification to be ontologically noncommitting, which requires that the two quantifiers have different meanings—but no different meaning for the substitutional quantifier is forthcoming. What van Inwagen fails to appreciate is that substitutional quantification is directed at a criterion of ontological commitment, namely, W. V. O. Quine’s, which is quite different from van Inwagen’s criterion. Substitutional quantification successfully avoids the commitments Quine’s criterion would engender but has the same commitments as existential quantification given van Inwagen’s criterion. The question, then, is whether the existential quantifier is ontologically committing, as van Inwagen believes. The answer to that question will depend on whether the ordinary language “there is/are,” which is codified by the existential quantifier, is ontologically committing. There are good reasons to doubt that it is
Keywords Peter van Inwagen   philosophy of logic   ontological commitment   substitutional quantification   existential quantifiers
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DOI 10.1215/00294527-2798736
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References found in this work BETA

Interpreting Quantification.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):252 – 259.
Ontological Commitment.Alonzo Church - 1958 - Journal of Philosophy 55 (23):1008-1014.

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