International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):165 – 185 (2000)
One of the principal objections to a tensed or dynamic theory of time is the ancient puzzle about the extent of the present. Three alternative conceptions of the extent of the present are considered: an instantaneous present, an atomic present, and a non-metrical present. The first conception is difficult to reconcile with the objectivity of temporal becoming posited by a dynamic theory of time. The second conception solves that problem, but only at the expense of making change discontinuous. The third conception is the most plausible: that "the present" is a non-metrical notion which must be completed by the mention of some event or interval in order to have a measure, in which case what is present varies with one's context.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Aristotle - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-.
Similar books and articles
Re-Membering.Stephen David Ross - 2010 - International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:43-59.
Subjective Perception of Time and a Progressive Present Moment: The Neurobiological Key to Unlocking Consciousness.Peter Lynds - manuscript
The Passage of Time.Eric Olson - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
'Wholly Present' Defined.Thomas M. Crisp & Donald P. Smith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):318–344.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #101,849 of 2,164,556 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,948 of 2,164,556 )
How can I increase my downloads?