The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics

Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213 (1990)

Authors
Tim Crane
Central European University
Abstract
Many philosophers think that being in an intentional state is a matter of being related to a sentence in a mental language-a 'Language of Thought' (see especially Fodor 1975, 1987 Appendix; Field 1978). According to this view-which I shall call 'the LT hypothesis'-when anyone has a belief or a desire or a hope with a certain content, they have a sentence of this language, with that content, 'written' in their heads. The claim is meant quite literally: the mental representations that make up the items of this language have semantic and syntactic properties. This is why, according to this view, cognitive psychology does, and should, treat that part of the mind which deals with intentional states as a semantic and a syntactic 'engine'.
Keywords Language  Metaphysics  Semantics  Syntax  Thought
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1990.tb00159.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.
Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental Contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.

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