The Mental States of Persons and their Brains

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270 (2015)
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Abstract

Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.

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10.1017/s1358246115000053

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Tim Crane
Central European University

Citations of this work

Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?Tim Crane - 2023 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 65 (4):414-429.
A tale of two architectures.Majid D. Beni - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 98 (C):103257.
The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 36-57.
Mental fact and mental fiction.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2022 - In Tamás Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. New York & London: Routledge. pp. 303-319.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Mental representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
The strategy of model-based science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (5):725-740.

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