The origins of qualia
In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge (2000)
The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are physical.2 One may avoid this dilemma by adopting an epiphenomenalist view of consciousness, of course; but there is little independent reason for believing such a view. Rejecting epiphenomenalism, then, leaves contemporary philosophers with their problem: mental causation inclines them towards physicalism, while consciousness inclines them towards dualism
|Keywords||Mind-body Physicalism Qualia|
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A Diet, but Not the Qualia Plan: Reply to Amy Kind.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):679-680.
Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.J. Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6 (1035).
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