Authors
Tim Crane
Central European University
Alex Grzankowski
Birkbeck, University of London
Abstract
One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.
Keywords perception  intentionality   adverbialism  intentionalism  naive realism  propositional attitudes  content  physicalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The many-property problem is your problem, too.Justin D’Ambrosio - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):811-832.
A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.
Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness.Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.
The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):488-512.
There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter.Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.
Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-03-12

Total views
101 ( #100,294 of 2,420,737 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
101 ( #6,204 of 2,420,737 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes