Abstract
In this paper I argue for the idea that, throughout the history of science, there are some cases of theory change that would show how science develops with no referential continuity. For this purpose, I analyze Psillos’ proposal of a theory of reference used to account for referential continuity in conceptual transitions. This kind of continuity is requested by Psillos —as by other philosophers— in his defense of scientific realism. By means of a historical case, the theory of germplasm of August Weismann, I intend to demonstrate that Psillos’ demand for reference continuity can be found to be inadequate. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p335
Keywords Scientific realism, scientific development, referential continuity, germplasm.  Realismo científico, desenvolvimento científico, continuidade referencial, germoplasma
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p335
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The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Über Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Ueber Sinn Und Bedeutung (Summary).Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1 (5):574-575.
Explanation and Reference.Hilary Putnam - 1973 - In Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214.

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