Studia Logica 82 (3):307-327 (2006)

Authors
Max Cresswell
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which is intuitively ‘possible’ in natural language has the property that the whole set is possible. The argument of the paper is that the principles needed to shew that natural language possibility sentences involve quantification over worlds are analogous to those used in infinitary modal logic.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Computational Linguistics
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-006-8099-5
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Nature of Epistemic Space.David Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Moderate Modal Skepticism.Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 302-321.
C. I. Lewis on Possible Worlds.Igor Sedlar - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):283-291.

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