Authors
Aisling Crean
Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford
Abstract
This paper sets up and then solves a puzzle for the sceptical realist interpretation of Hume. The puzzle takes off when the sceptical realist attributes to Hume the following metaphysical theses: Causal powers grounding necessary connections in nature exist. Causal powers grounding necessary connections in nature are what make things happen. It then attributes an epistemological thesis to him: We have no knowledge of causal powers in nature nor of the necessary connections in nature which these powers ground. But putting these three theses together seems to yield a problematic result. The epistemological thesis seems to have two corollaries as its upshot. We cannot know that causal powers grounding necessary connections in nature exist. We cannot know that causal powers grounding necessary connections in nature are what make things happen. That is, we cannot know and. New Hume’s position, the sceptical realist interpretation, seems to make Hume out to be arguing for a view that is self-undermining or dialectically unstable by his own empiricist lights. I argue that there is an overlooked externalist dimension to Hume’s epistemology and draw on this to solve the puzzle. In diesem Artikel wird zunächst ein Problem für die skeptisch-realistische Interpretation Humes aufgeworfen, sodann aber aufgelöst. Das Problem entsteht, wenn der skeptische Realismus Hume die folgenden metaphysischen Thesen zuschreibt: Es gibt kausale Kräfte, die den notwendigen Verknüpfungen in der Natur zugrunde liegen. Die kausalen Kräfte, die den notwendigen Verknüpfungen in der Natur zugrunde liegen, treiben das Geschehen in der Welt an. Zudem wird Hume eine epistemische These zugeschrieben: Wir können weder von den kausalen Kräften, noch von den daraus resultierenden notwendigen Verknüpfungen in der Natur Wissen erlangen. Wenn wir aber diese drei Thesen zusammen nehmen, erhalten wir ein problematisches Resultat. Die epistemische These scheint dann zwei Korollare zu haben. Wir können nicht wissen, dass es kausale Kräfte gibt, die den notwendigen Verknüpfungen in der Natur zugrunde liegen. Wir können nicht wissen, dass die kausalen Kräfte, die den notwendigen Verknüpfungen in der Natur zugrunde liegen, das Geschehen in der Welt antreiben. Mit anderen Worten, wir können über und nichts wissen. Im Lichte seines Empirismus betrachtet, höhlt die neue realistische Interpretation Humes daher dessen Position aus und macht sie dialektisch instabil. Ich werde hier jedoch zeigen, dass es eine externalistische Dimension in Humes Erkenntnistheorie gibt, die bislang übersehen wurde und die diese Schwierigkeiten auflösen kann.
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DOI 10.30965/26664275-01301002
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.

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