A parametric, resource-bounded generalization of löb’s theorem, and a robust cooperation criterion for open-source game theory

Journal of Symbolic Logic 84 (4):1368-1381 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This article presents two theorems: a generalization of Löb’s Theorem that applies to formal proof systems operating with bounded computational resources, such as formal verification software or theorem provers, and a theorem on the robust cooperation of agents that employ proofs about one another’s source code as unexploitable criteria for cooperation. The latter illustrates a capacity for outperforming classical Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, attaining mutually cooperative program equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma while remaining unexploitable, i.e., sometimes achieving the outcome, and never receiving the outcome as player 1.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Robust program equilibrium.Caspar Oesterheld - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (1):143-159.
Cantor theorem and friends, in logical form.Silvio Valentini - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (4):502-508.
Herbrand consistency of some arithmetical theories.Saeed Salehi - 2012 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 77 (3):807-827.
Games without rules.Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (4):315-347.
Exploring the future with resource-bounded agents.Michael Fisher & Chiara Ghidini - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):3-21.
Generalization of Bell's theorem.Nick Herbert & Jack Karush - 1978 - Foundations of Physics 8 (3-4):313-317.


Added to PP

15 (#919,495)

6 months
5 (#652,053)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references