II—Moral Testimony Pessimism: A Defence

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Abstract
This paper defends moral testimony pessimism, the view that there is something morally or epistemically regrettable about relying on the moral testimony of others, against several arguments in Lillehammer . One central such argument is that reliance on testimony is inconsistent with the exercise of true practical wisdom. Lillehammer doubts whether such reliance is always objectionable, but it is important to note that moral testimony pessimism is best understood as a view about the pro tanto, rather than the overall, badness of relying on testimony. One must also be clear about what counts as genuine moral testimony: there will be morally charged occasions when a virtuous person will properly rely on the views of others. It can also plausibly be argued that relying on moral testimony may constitute a lack of full autonomy. After discussing some remaining issues concerning the definition of moral testimony, a possible analogy between lying and relying on testimony, and the implications of untrustworthiness for the truth of moral testimony pessimism, the paper ends with a return to the case against relying on moral testimony, grounded on a conception of the role of knowledge and understanding in virtue.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00236.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Clarendon Press.
How to Be a Pessimist About Aesthetic Testimony.Robert Hopkins - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):138-157.
I—Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
Ethica Nicomachea. Aristotle - 1894 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Testimony and Moral Understanding.McShane Paddy Jane - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):245-271.
Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):261-284.
Moral Realism and Reliance on Moral Testimony.Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-13.
Trust in the Normative Domain.Stephen Wright - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):187-204.

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