So-labeled neo-fregeanism

Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279 (1993)
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Abstract

I explain and criticize a theory of beliefs and of belief sentences offered by Graeme Forbes. My main criticism will be directed at Forbes' idea that, as a matter of the semantic rules of belief reporting -- as a matter of the meaning of belief ascriptions -- to get at the subject's way of thinking in an attitude ascription, we must use expressions that are "linguistic counterparts" of the subject's expressions. I think we often do something like that, but that we have other, equally good methods of getting at ways of thinking; so what is wanted is a more inclusive characterization of the rules of belief reporting by which we manage to do it -- a characterization more along the lines of: anything goes.

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Mark Crimmins
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Understanding Belief Reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Propositional Attitude Reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Epistemological Argument Against Descriptivism.Robin Jeshion - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):325 - 345.
All the Superhero’s Names.Olga Poller - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 29:127-158.

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References found in this work

The Indispensability of Sinn.Graeme Forbes - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.

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