Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279 (1993)
AbstractI explain and criticize a theory of beliefs and of belief sentences offered by Graeme Forbes. My main criticism will be directed at Forbes' idea that, as a matter of the semantic rules of belief reporting -- as a matter of the meaning of belief ascriptions -- to get at the subject's way of thinking in an attitude ascription, we must use expressions that are "linguistic counterparts" of the subject's expressions. I think we often do something like that, but that we have other, equally good methods of getting at ways of thinking; so what is wanted is a more inclusive characterization of the rules of belief reporting by which we manage to do it -- a characterization more along the lines of: anything goes.
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Citations of this work
The Epistemological Argument Against Descriptivism.Robin Jeshion - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):325 - 345.
References found in this work
The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.Mark Crimmins & John Perry - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685.
Languages of Possibility: An Essay in Philosophical Logic.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.