The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs

Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 (1989)
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Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The belief puzzles (Hesperus, Cicero, Pierre) involve reports about two different notions. So the analysis gets the puzzling truth values right.

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Author Profiles

John Perry
University of California, Riverside
Mark Crimmins
Stanford University

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