Argumentation 7 (4):385-402 (1993)

Most work on fallacies continues to conceptualize fallacious reasoning as involving a breach of a formal or quasi-formal rule. Chaim Perelman's theory of argumentation provides a way to conceptualize fallacies in a completely different way. His approach depends on an understanding of standards of rationality as essentially connected with conceptions of universality. Such an approach allows one to get beyond some of the basic problems of fallacy theory, and turns informal logic toward substantive philosophical questions. I show this by reinterpreting three so-called fallacies - theargumentum ad baculum, equivocation and composition/division - in the light of Perelman's account
Keywords Fallacies  universality  rationality  Perelman  rhetoric  philosophy   ad baculum  equivocation  composition and division
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DOI 10.1007/BF00711057
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1863 - Cleveland: Cambridge University Press.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Vale Press.
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman - 1969 - Notre Dame, [Ind.]University of Notre Dame Press.

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