Expert-oriented abilities vs. novice-oriented abilities: An alternative account of epistemic authority

Episteme 15 (4):476-498 (2018)

Authors
Michel Croce
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess.
Keywords epistemic authority  expert  preemptive reasons  udnerstanding  intellectual virtues
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2017.16
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References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.

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Citations of this work BETA

On What It Takes to Be an Expert.Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.
Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity.Michel Croce - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.

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