Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153 (2012)
Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
|Keywords||Properties Dispositions Laws Categorical Subjunctive conditional analysis Humean Supervenience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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