Goodbye, Humean Supervenience
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153 (2012)
Abstract
Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Sometimes the world is not enough: The pursuit of explanatory laws in a Humean world.Barry Ward - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):175–197.
Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part I: Humean supervenience.John Earman & John T. Roberts - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):1–22.
Relational Holism and Humean Supervenience.George Darby - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):773-788.
Chance and Necessity : From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection.Wolfgang Spohn - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 101-132.
Dispositions and the Argument from Science.Neil E. Williams - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.
Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part II: The epistemological argument for Humean supervenience.John Earman & John T. Roberts - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):253–286.
Analytics
Added to PP
2010-02-15
Downloads
1,595 (#3,611)
6 months
81 (#12,881)
2010-02-15
Downloads
1,595 (#3,611)
6 months
81 (#12,881)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Dynamic Humeanism.Michael Townsen Hicks - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):983-1007.
Do Categorical Properties Confer Dispositions on Their Bearers?Vassilis Livanios - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):61-82.
References found in this work
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.