Abstract
According to a well-known interpretation, Henry of Ghent holds that possible but non-existent essences – items merely with what Henry labels ‘ esse essentiae ’ – have some reality external to the divine mind, but short of actual existence ( esse existentiae ). I argue that this reading of Henry is mistaken. Furthermore, Henry identifies any essence, considered independently of its existence as a universal concept or as instantiated in a particular as an item that has some kind of reality in the divine intellect, and that constitutes an object of thought for that intellect. This object is distinguished from the universal concepts of creaturely cognition.
Keywords Henry of Ghent
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/agph.2010.006
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,385
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility.S. Newlands - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):155-187.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-06-30

Total views
73 ( #132,273 of 2,362,114 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #261,586 of 2,362,114 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes