Topoi 38 (3):561-575 (2019)

Authors
Gabriella Crocco
Université d'Aix-Marseille III
Abstract
After a brief discussion of Kreisel’s notion of informal rigour and Myhill’s notion of absolute proof, Gödel’s analysis of the subject is presented. It is shown how Gödel avoids the notion of informal proof because such a use would contradict one of the senses of “formal” that Gödel wants to preserve. This Gödelian notion of “formal” is directly tied to his notion of absolute proof and to the question of the general applicability of concepts, in a way that overcomes both Kreisel and Myhill’s conceptions. This paper aims to contribute to the present-day debate on informal and epistemic mathematics, focusing on what appears necessary for a better understanding of the issues at stake.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-017-9515-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Nancy Cartwright - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):244-247.
Proofs and Refutations.Imre Lakatos - 1980 - Noûs 14 (3):474-478.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logical Foundations and Kant's Principles of Formal Logic.Srećko Kovač - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (1):48-70.

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