More on the paradox of the knower without epistemic closure

Mind 113 (449):109-114 (2004)
In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure”, MIND 110:319-33, 2001, I develop a version of the Knower Paradox which does not assume epistemic closure, and I use it to argue that the original Knower Paradox does not support an argument against epistemic closure. In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure?”, MIND 113:95-107, 2004, Gabriel Uzquiano, using his own result, argues that my rebuttal to the anti-closure argument is not successful. I respond here by arguing that in order to use Uzquiano’s result in an argument against closure, one must assume an implausible skepticism about arithmetic.
Keywords Knower Paradox  Epistemic Closure
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DOI 10.1093/mind/113.449.109
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