Nonbelief and the desire-as-belief thesis

Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (a) and (b) cannot both be true if it is possible for there to exist an agent who has a desire initially, say the desire for the truth of p, and then expands the corpus of propositions she believes to include p. This result provides a new route to the denial of (a).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,346

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
145 (#88,419)

6 months
7 (#117,456)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charles B. Cross
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

Consistent Desires and Climate Change.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.
The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
Intending.Donald Davidson - 1978 - Philosophy of History and Action 11:41-60.

View all 24 references / Add more references