Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 29:118-139 (2004)
The principle of government neutrality, as commonly understood, enshrines the idea that government bodies ought to treat all citizens equally. I argue that the traditional interpretation of this principle in liberal constitutionalism has involved a prohibition against legal actors distinguishing between subjects on the basis of their personal characteristics. This approach is unsatisfactory, as it constrains the law's ability to respond to evolved social practices of discrimination. To illustrate this point, I draw on the writings of Jean-François Lyotard and recent judicial decisions on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
|Keywords||Discrimination Neutrality Equal treatment 390302 Jurisprudence and Legal Theory 1801 Law|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Impossibility of Political Neutrality.Noriaki Iwasa - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (29):147-155.
A Conflict Between Representation and Neutrality.Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (1):69-96.
The Progressive Era and the Political Economy of Big Government∗.Richard Sylla - 1991 - Critical Review 5 (4):531-557.
Liberal Neutrality or Liberal Tolerance?Colin M. Macleod - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (5):529 - 559.
Why Liberal Neutralists Should Accept Educational Neutrality.Matt Sensat Waldren - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):71-83.
The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy.Douglas W. Kmiec (ed.) - 2009 - Lexisnexis Matthew Bender.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #312,813 of 2,164,599 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,948 of 2,164,599 )
How can I increase my downloads?