Reinterpreting government neutrality

The principle of government neutrality, as commonly understood, enshrines the idea that government bodies ought to treat all citizens equally. I argue that the traditional interpretation of this principle in liberal constitutionalism has involved a prohibition against legal actors distinguishing between subjects on the basis of their personal characteristics. This approach is unsatisfactory, as it constrains the law's ability to respond to evolved social practices of discrimination. To illustrate this point, I draw on the writings of Jean-François Lyotard and recent judicial decisions on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Keywords Discrimination   Neutrality   Equal treatment  390302 Jurisprudence and Legal Theory  1801 Law
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