Subjectivity: Locating the first-person in being and time

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):433 – 454 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It is often held that, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's account of intentionality makes no essential reference to the first- person stance. This paper argues, on the contrary, that an account of the first- person, or 'subjectivity', is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it. It first offers an argument as to why the account of intelligibility in Division I of Being and Time, based on a form of third- person self-awareness, provides a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for intentionality. It then shows that Heidegger provides a further necessary condition in his analysis of the collapse of the one-self in Division II. This condition is 'conscience', which is both a genuine first- person mode of self-awareness and, it is argued, the origin of reason as that which distinguishes factic 'grounds' from normative 'justifications'



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,408

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Quantum Chaos and Semiclassical Mechanics.Robert Batterman - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:50-65.
Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents.Peter J. Taylor - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304-310.
How Bad Is Rape?H. E. Baber - 1987 - Hypatia 2 (2):125-138.
The Hiddenness Argument Revisited.J. L. Schellenberg - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (3):287-303.


Added to PP

94 (#165,161)

6 months
1 (#1,005,371)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Crowell
Rice University

References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind.John Haugeland - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Pathmarks.Martin Heidegger (ed.) - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pathmarks.Frederick A. Olafson - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):299-302.

View all 11 references / Add more references