Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):143-168 (1997)
Discrepancies between an agent's goals and beliefs play an important, if implicit, role in determining what a rational agent is motivated to do. This is most obvious in cases where an agent achieves a complex goal incrementally and must deliberate anew as each milestone is reached. In such cases the concept of goal/belief discrepancy defines an appropriate space to which a degree-of-achievement yardstick can be applied. This paper presents soundness and completeness results concerning a logic for reasoning about goal/belief discrepancy, and it is suggested that a certain species of goal/belief discrepancy captures the concept of desire
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Knowledge in Flux. Modelling the Dymanics of Epistemic States.P. Gärdenfors - 1988 - MIT Press.
Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi.Richmond H. Thomason - 1970 - In Karel Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Problems in Logic: Some Recent Developments. D. Reidel. pp. 56--76.
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