The modal logic of discrepancy

Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):143-168 (1997)
Abstract
Discrepancies between an agent's goals and beliefs play an important, if implicit, role in determining what a rational agent is motivated to do. This is most obvious in cases where an agent achieves a complex goal incrementally and must deliberate anew as each milestone is reached. In such cases the concept of goal/belief discrepancy defines an appropriate space to which a degree-of-achievement yardstick can be applied. This paper presents soundness and completeness results concerning a logic for reasoning about goal/belief discrepancy, and it is suggested that a certain species of goal/belief discrepancy captures the concept of desire
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/A:1017939604673
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The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
Belief, Desire, and Revision.John Collins - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):333 - 342.

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