Mind 110 (438):319-333 (2001)

Authors
Charles B. Cross
University of Georgia
Abstract
In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
Keywords Epistemic Closure  Knower Paradox
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DOI 10.1093/mind/110.438.319
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Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220.
The Knower Paradox in the Light of Provability Interpretations of Modal Logic.Paul Égré - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):13-48.

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