The paradox of the knower without epistemic closure

Mind 110 (438):319-333 (2001)
Abstract
In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
Keywords Epistemic Closure  Knower Paradox
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DOI 10.1093/mind/110.438.319
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Non-Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Paradox of the Knower Revisited.Walter Dean & Hidenori Kurokawa - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):199-224.

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