The paradox of the knower without epistemic closure

Mind 110 (438):319-333 (2001)
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Abstract

In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.

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Charles B. Cross
University of Georgia

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