From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research


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Vincenzo Crupi
Università degli Studi di Torino
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DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00219
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New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.

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