Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4):579-602 (2010)

Abstract
Critical realists argue that the condition of possibility of the sciences is that they are based on a correct set of ontological assumptions or definitions. The task of philosophy is to underlabor for the sciences, by ensuring that the explanations developed are congruent with the ontological condition of possibility of the sciences. This requires critical realists to justify their claims about ontology and, to do this, they turn to ontological assumptions that are held to obtain in natural scientific knowledge and social agents’ lay knowledge. A number of problems with this approach are discussed and a problem-solving alternative is advocated
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DOI 10.1177/0048393109340664
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References found in this work BETA

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowing Neoliberalism.Jana Bacevic - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (4):380-392.
The Poverty of Ontological Reasoning.Leonidas Tsilipakos - 2012 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (2):201-219.
Theoretical Procedures and Elder-Vass’s Critical Realist Ontology.Leonidas Tsilipakos - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6):0048393112461055.

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