Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture

Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340 (1998)

Authors
Joe Cruz
Williams College
Abstract
The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support this claim.
Keywords Architecture  Cognitive  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00079
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,545
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Fodor's Problem.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):502-523.
In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts.Robert W. Lurz - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):270–296.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
59 ( #124,422 of 2,325,487 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #215,232 of 2,325,487 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature