Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy

Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199 (2008)
Abstract
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal result is a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction fallacy, which is proven _robust_ (i.e., not depending on various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation). The proposed analysis is shown distinct from contentions that the conjunction effect is in fact not a fallacy, and is compared with major competing explanations of the phenomenon, including earlier references to a confirmation-theoretic account
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13546780701643406
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,567
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw008.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
178 ( #26,051 of 2,180,798 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #299,817 of 2,180,798 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums