Representing high-level properties in perceptual experience

Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294 (2012)
Authors
Parker Crutchfield
Western Michigan University School Of Medicine
Abstract
High-level theory is the view that high-level properties?the property of being a dog, being a tiger, being an apple, being a pair of lips, etc.?can be represented in perceptual experience. Low-level theory denies this and claims that high-level properties are only represented at the level of perceptual judgment and are products of cognitive interpretation of low-level sensory information (color, shape, illumination). This paper discusses previous attempts to establish high-level theory, their weaknesses, and an argument for high-level theory that does not have these weaknesses.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.579422
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,515
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Visual Experience: Rich but Impenetrable.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3389-3406.
Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
The Significance of High-Level Content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):553-577.
Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):19-38.
High-Level Properties and Visual Experience.William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):43-55.
Levels Indeed! A Response to Broadbent.J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart - 1985 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 114:193-7.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-11-29

Total downloads
174 ( #32,367 of 2,268,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #106,489 of 2,268,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature