Representing high-level properties in perceptual experience

Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294 (2012)
Abstract
High-level theory is the view that high-level properties?the property of being a dog, being a tiger, being an apple, being a pair of lips, etc.?can be represented in perceptual experience. Low-level theory denies this and claims that high-level properties are only represented at the level of perceptual judgment and are products of cognitive interpretation of low-level sensory information (color, shape, illumination). This paper discusses previous attempts to establish high-level theory, their weaknesses, and an argument for high-level theory that does not have these weaknesses.
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.579422
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
Observation Reconsidered.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.

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Citations of this work BETA
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-22.

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