The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism

In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 125--42 (2004)

Joe Cruz
Williams College
Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of the distinction between justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs.1 Understanding that distinction has occasionally been obscured by attention to the analysis of knowledge and to the Gettier problem, but our view is that these problems, while interesting, should not completely seduce philosophers away from central questions about epistemic justification. A plausible starting point in the discussion of justification is that the distinction between justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs is not the same as the distinction between true beliefs and false beliefs. This follows from the mundane observation that it is possible to rationally believe..
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
The Function of Perception.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Synthese Library. pp. 13-31.

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