Wrongful Procreation, Factory Farming, and the Afterlife

Faith and Philosophy 38 (3):337-358 (2021)
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Sometimes, I can affect whether an individual is created, but not how their life goes if they’re created. If their life will be bad enough, I apparently wrong them by allowing their creation. But sometimes, popular religious views imply that the created individual is guaranteed to have an infinitely good existence on balance. Since, I argue, I don’t wrong someone by allowing their creation when it’s infinitely good for them on balance, these views apparently have unacceptable implications for procreation ethics. After surveying various responses, I tentatively suggest that the best solution may involve adopting an unusual metaphysics of procreation.



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Dustin Crummett
University of Notre Dame

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