Overdetermination in Intuitive Causal Decision Theory

In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. (2013)
Authors
Abstract
Causal decision theory defines a rational action as the one that tends to cause the best outcomes. If we adopt counterfactual or probabilistic theories of causation, then we may face problems in overdetermination cases. Do such problems affect Causal decision theory? The aim of this work is to show that the concept of causation that has been fundamental in all versions of causal decision theory is not the most intuitive one. Since overdetermination poses problems for a counterfactual theory of causation, one can think that a version of causal decision theory based on counterfactual dependence may also be vulnerable to such scenarios. However, only when an intuitive, not analyzed notion of causation is presupposed as a ground for a more plausible version of causal decision theory, overdetermination turns problematic. The first interesting consequence of this is that there are more reasons to dismiss traditional theories of causation (and to accept others). The second is to confirm that traditional causal decision theory is not based on our intuitive concept of the causal relation.
Keywords causal decision theory  causation  overdetermination  preemption  trumping  decisional overdetermination
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):335-351.
Counterfactual Overdetermination Vs. The Causal Exclusion Problem.Georg Sparber - 2005 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4):479 - 490.
Exclusion, Overdetermination, and the Nature of Causation.Thomas D. Bontly - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:261-282.
Causal Overdetermination for Humeans?Michael Esfeld - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):99-104.
A Probabilistic Theory of Causal Necessity.Deborah A. Rosen - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):71-86.
Interactionism and Overdetermination.Eugene O. Mills - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.
Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.
Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
Varieties of Multiple Antecedent Cause.Jeff Engelhardt - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):231-246.
Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251-262.
Causal Powers.Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):27-59.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-07

Total views
212 ( #26,770 of 2,312,953 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #40,738 of 2,312,953 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature