Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198 (2016)
Authors
Charles Cote-Bouchard
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for grounding epistemic normativity.
Keywords Epistemic normativity  Aim of belief  Epistemic norms  Epistemic reasons  Normativity  Epistemic constitutivism  Constitutivism  Normativism
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0657-8
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References found in this work BETA

Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.

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