Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198 (2016)

Authors
Charles Cote-Bouchard
Université de Montréal
Abstract
For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for grounding epistemic normativity.
Keywords Epistemic normativity  Aim of belief  Epistemic norms  Epistemic reasons  Normativity  Epistemic constitutivism  Constitutivism  Normativism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0657-8
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Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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