Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism

Ithaque 8:1-16 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,712

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.
Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
Epistemic Deontologism and Role-Oughts.Jon Altschul - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):245-263.
Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology.Howard Benjamin Shaeffer - 1999 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara


Added to PP

20 (#571,565)

6 months
1 (#481,788)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charles Cote-Bouchard
Montmorency College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references