Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection

Authors
Charles Cote-Bouchard
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three
Keywords Epistemic Normativity  Epistemic Instrumentalism  Normativity  Metaethics  Epistemic Reasons  Reasons  Neo-Humeanism  Subjectivism  Reasons Internalism  Metaepistemology
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1080/09672559.2015.1042007
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References found in this work BETA

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.

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Reasons and Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):98-122.

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