Manuscrito 40 (4):97-111 (2017)

Charles Cote-Bouchard
Université de Montréal
ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument, moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco, an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin.
Keywords Open Question Argument  G.E. Moore  Metaepistemology  Epistemic Normativity  Epistemology  Metaethics  Metanormativity  Daniel Greco
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1590/
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
What is "Naturalized Epistemology?".Jaegwon Kim - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:381-405.
Truth and Correct Belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Lehrer on Consciousness.Leopold Stubenberg - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):131-140.
Epistemological Open Questions.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.
Epistemological Dilemmas of Contemporary Ethics.Harun Tepe - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:25-30.
Evidential Support, Reliability, and Hume's Problem of Induction.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
Random Closed Sets Viewed as Random Recursions.R. Daniel Mauldin & Alexander P. McLinden - 2009 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 48 (3-4):257-263.
Epistemological Dilemmas of Contemporary Ethics.Harun Tepe - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:25-30.
Questions de Philosophie Soumises Par ‘Ēlī Habiliō À ¦Ēm Tōb Ibn ¦Ēm Tōb, V. 1472’.Jean-Pierre Rotschild - 1994 - Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 61:105-132.
The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.
A Reply to Strouds Skeptic.John Greco - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (1):23-39.


Added to PP index

Total views
32 ( #360,888 of 2,533,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #260,743 of 2,533,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes