Can transcendental intersubjectivity be naturalised?

Abstract
I discuss Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project on the one hand and Molyneux’s Question on the other
Keywords Husserl  Intersubjectivity  Mirror Neurons  Neonate Imitation  Molyneux's Question
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-009-9149-z
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Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.

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