As you were?

Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):117 – 132 (2006)
Abstract
What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral epistemology. On this view, the empirical study of moral judgement does have important implications for moral philosophy. But moral philosophy also has important implications for the empirical study of moral judgement.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13869790500492730
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Making Psychology Normatively Significant.Regina A. Rini - 2013 - Journal of Ethics 17 (3):257-274.
Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature.David Morrow - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
24 ( #216,268 of 2,193,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,647 of 2,193,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature