Authors
Garrett Cullity
Australian National University
Abstract
For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper argues that three principles, taken together, give us a good answer to these questions; that they license a form of provisional moral self-trust; and that they reveal an interestingly distinctive form of pragmatic encroachment in relation to the epistemic standards governing moral belief.
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-021-10209-0
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

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